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A two-dimensional small-world type network, subject to spatial prisoners’ dilemma dynamics and
containing an influential node defined as a special node with a finite density of directed random
links to the other nodes in the network, is numerically investigated. It is shown that the degree
of cooperation does not remain at a steady state level but displays a punctuated equilibrium type
behavior manifested by the existence of sudden breakdowns of cooperation. The breakdown of
cooperation is linked to an imitation of a successful selfish strategy of the influential node. It is also
found that while the breakdown of cooperation occurs suddenly, the recovery of it requires longer
time. This recovery time may, depending on the degree of steady state cooperation, either increase
or decrease with an increasing number of long range connections.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 84.35.+i, 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since it’s introduction iterated Prisoners’
Dilemma games has been central in understanding the
conditions for cooperation among populations of selfish
individuals. [1] Applications has ranged from RNA virus
interactions [2] to Westernization in central Africa [3],
and consequently a variety of generalizations has been
studied. The present work takes the spatial Prisoners’
Dilemma of Nowak et al. [4] as its starting-point. [5]
Here the players are situated on a two-dimensional lat-
tice, interacting only with their neighbors. Rather than
examining the stability of strategies based on memory of
the opponent’s behavior, as in the ordinary iterated Pris-
oners’ Dilemma, the spatial Prisoners’ Dilemma serves
to answer questions such as under what conditions co-
operation can be stable in (social) space. [6] Following
Refs. [4] the interactions can be chosen as simple as fol-
lows: The payoff is simultaneously calculated for every
node (player). The contribution to the gain from an en-
counter is illustrated in Fig. 1(a); the sum of the encoun-
ters from each neighbor gives the gain for a certain node.
In the next move each node follows the most successful
neighbor. (This is a feature of successful strategies such
as tit-for-tat [1] or win-stay lose-shift [7] of the two-player
Prisoners’ Dilemma.) Defined in this way, the dynamics
may e.g. reflect that of groups of individuals with mutual
trust and cooperation interacting with social regions of
unrest. To add the element of occasional irrational moves
by individuals, and get a way from a purely deterministic
dynamics, one can allow for ‘mutations’: a random strat-
egy (D or C is chosen randomly) is assigned to a player
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FIG. 1: (a) The encounter payoff: When two cooperators
(C) encounter, both score unity. When a cooperator meets a
defector (D) the defector score b and the cooperator 0. An
encounter between two defectors results in 0 for both nodes.
(b) The network: A two-dimensional square lattice with eight
nearest neighbors and long range “short-cuts” are randomly
added (red lines without arrows). The influential node (start-
ing point for lines with arrows) effects the network over long
ranges through unidirectional connections (lines with arrows).
with probability pm.
Important features of social networks such as high clus-
tering and short characteristic path-length can be mod-
eled by the Watts and Strogatz (WS) model [8, 9], where
the links of a regular network are randomly rewired to
introduce long-range “short-cuts”. On a one-dimensional
small-world network the presence of long-range connec-
tions has been found to increase the density of defec-
tors [10]. To get closer to the original work by Nowak
et al. we start from a two-dimensional WS model net-
work. In society, massmedial persons may influence oth-
ers much stronger than the average individual, still these
influential persons are coupled back to their social sur-
roundings. One concrete example along this general line
is smoking among adolescents, a behavior spurred by
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FIG. 2: The averaged cooperator density in a regular network
with an influential node versus temptation b. For 7/8 < b <
8/5 we have 0 < 〈ρc〉 < 1. The two cases we study the time
evolution for is b = 1.3 and b = 1.45.
both the individual’s social surroundings and role models
of the media. [11] To model this situation we let one node
have additional directed links randomly distributed out-
wards to the rest of the network. In this way we hope to
catch some general effects that such an influential node
might have on the dynamical behavior of a social net-
work.
II. THE MODEL
The starting point is a L × L square grid (with pe-
riodic boundary conditions) where each node has eight
neighbors reachable by a chess king’s move. Long range
bidirectional links are added with a probability p making
the average number of short-cuts Np (N = L2). One
node is randomly chosen as the influential node and in
addition to its local bidirectional connections, this node
is unidirectionally connected to arbitrary nodes of the
network with a probability ps. These additional links are
directed so that nodes unidirectionally connected to the
special node sees the special node as one of its neighbors,
but not vice versa. The influential node only gets feed-
back from its local mutual connections. (See Fig. 1(b).)
In our simulations we use a typical lattice size is L =
32, with the number of additional directed connections
to the influential node given by Nps with ps typically
0.2, the mutation rate pm typically 0.001, the shortcut
density p from 0 to 0.1, and O(100) network realizations.
The gain of the certain node (in our version of prisoners’
dilemma game) is calculated as the average score of the
individual encounters: the sum of the encounters from
each neighbor is divided by the number of the neighbors.
This normalization is done to avoid an additional bias
from the higher degree of some nodes, and thus keep the
game closer Nowak and May’s original spatial prisoners’
dilemma game.
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FIG. 3: The time evolution of cooperator density. Without
(a) and with (b) “influential node” node. The temptation is
b = 1.3.
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FIG. 4: The jump structure obtained from the average over
about thousand jumps in Fig. 3. The sharp decrease of co-
operator density ρC is followed by a gradual recovery to the
equilibrium value. Inset: The long-time recovery behavior is
well described by an exponential |ρC − 〈ρC〉| ∝ exp(−t/τ )
with the recovery time τ ≈ 4.4.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to analyze the dynamics of this model we start
by calculating the average density of cooperators ρC as
a function of the pay-off b between defector D and co-
operator C (see Fig. 1(a)). As seen in Fig. 2 ρC has
a step structure. These steps reflect the interplay be-
tween the underlying spatial structure and the PD dy-
namics [4]: Each level is characterized by the condition
that n C’s wins over m D’s and consequently the step
condition given by n = bm and the sequence of steps
discernible in Fig. 2 is 7/8, 1, 8/7, 7/6, 6/5, 5/4, 4/3,
7/5, 3/2, 8/5 corresponding to the case when ps = 0 and
the additional steps at 8/9, 9/8 due to the additional
coupling for nodes attached to the influential node. For
b > 8/5 there is no cooperation left and ρC = 0 and for
b < 7/8 cooperation wins and ρc = 1.
In the following we will focus on b = 1.3 which is as-
sociated with a plateau in the middle with ρC ≈ 0.76.
3Fig. 3(a) shows the time evolution for b = 1.3 and ps = 0
i.e. the case when there is no influential node. In this
case the level of cooperation remains stable with rela-
tively small fluctuations around the average value. This
feature is dramatically changed when we introduce the
special influential node as shown in Fig. 3(b) for ps = 0.2.
The equilibrium is now punctuated by sudden drops of
cooperation. In Fig. 4 we display the average drop (ob-
tained by averaging over about thousand sudden drops).
The typical feature is a very dramatic sudden jump fol-
lowed by a slower recovering back to the steady state sit-
uation. This recovery back to steady state is exponential
as demonstrated in the inset of Fig. 4.
As a first step we investigate what exactly triggers the
sudden drop of cooperation: The basic mechanisms is
that a situation arises where the influential node as a
defector gets a very high score. The successful defector
strategy of the influential node is then rapidly spread
through the directed links from this node i.e. the sudden
drop in cooperation is triggered by an imitation of a suc-
cessful selfish behavior of the influential node. Figure 5
shows a typical example of how the triggering high score
situation is built up in the environment of the influen-
tial node. The figure shows four consecutive time steps
for the same run as in Fig. 3. In the second timestep
(Fig. 5(b)) the influential node is surrounded by seven
cooperators and hence gets the high score 7b/8. This
high score causes an instability since it causes the de-
fector strategy to be imitated both by the immediate
surrounding and by the rest of the network through the
directed links from the influential nodes (Fig. 5(c)). In
the next step (Fig. 5(d)) the defector strategy spreads to
the nodes in the vicinity of the nodes connected to the
influential node.
How often does such a breakdown occur? Figure 6
shows the average probability distribution for the wait-
ing time between two breakdowns. The waiting time dis-
tribution Pw(tw) is clearly exponential for large tw. In
addition it has some structure as discussed below.
In order to gain some further insight we investigate
how the recovery time and waiting time depends on the
parameters of the model. The waiting time distribution
does not change qualitatively when a rewiring probabil-
ity is introduced. The only change is a small quantitative
decrease in the average recovery time. This is in accord
with the intuitive idea that more long range connection
will in general speed up the time evolution. In our par-
ticular model it means that the triggering type situation
(shown in Fig. 5(b)) will arise more frequently when long
range connections are present. The structure of the wait-
ing time distribution consists to good approximation of
two exponential decays as shown in in Fig. 6 (a). This
structure of the waiting time distribution is caused by an
interplay between the spatial lattice and the PD pay-off.
Figure 6(b) shows how the recovery time τ depends
on the rewiring probability p. The striking thing here is
that for b = 1.3 and ρc ≈ 0.76 the recovery time increases
with increasing p so that actually more connections be-
tween different parts of the network will slow down the
recovery. However for b = 1.45 and ρc ≈ 0.6 the recovery
time instead decreases with increasing p as also shown in
Fig. 6(b) Consequently the change in the recovery time
with p depends on the relative proportion of defectors and
collaborators in the steady state situation: If the cooper-
ator density is large enough then an additional short-cut
will more often connect a defector to a cooperator which
promotes the defector strategy and slows down the re-
covery. If the cooperator density is smaller the situation
changes and an increase in the number of long range con-
nections will speed up the recovery towards the steady
state level. It is interesting to note that an increase of
the recovery time with increasing p is somewhat contrary
to the intuitive idea that more connections will speed up
the time evolution.
The dependence on the mutation probability pm is
more trivial: The only effect that the mutation probabil-
ity seems to have is to speed up the time evolution. This
means that, in the limit of small pm, the recovery time
τ and the waiting time distribution P (tw) approaches fi-
nite values. At pm = 0.001 this limit is basically reached
for our lattice size L = 32. The only effect of a finite pm
in this limit is to prevent the system from getting stuck
in a purely deterministic cycle.
Finally we investigate the case when the influential
node is always defecting. This corresponds to the case
when an influential person does not take any feedback
from the environment nor does make any spontaneous
change in its strategy. This does in fact not change any
qualitative features in the behavior of our model.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the spatial Prisoners’ Dilemma
game for the case with one influential node. The most
striking feature of this model is the existence of sudden
breakdowns of cooperation. [12] This is caused by imi-
tation of a successful scoring by the defector strategy of
the influential node. These breakdowns are associated
with two distinct time scales. One time scale is the re-
covery time τ associated with the recovery back to the
steady state cooperation level after a sudden breakdown.
The most interesting feature with this recovery is that it
sometimes becomes slower with increasing small world
rewiring. Thus, contrary to the intuitive feeling that
more connections should just speed up the evolution, it
is also possible that the long range connections instead
slows down the time it takes to get back to the equi-
librium level. This slowing down of the recovery occurs
when the steady state cooperation level is large enough.
If the equilibrium cooperation level is small enough then
the recovery time gets shorter with an increasing number
of long range connections.
The second characteristic time is the time between the
sudden breakdowns of cooperation. It is associated with
how often in the steady state situation an event when the
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FIG. 5: Complete network configuration at the four consecutive time steps of the run illustrated in Fig. 3: In (a) the gain of the
leader node (that is a defector) scores 5b/8, in (b) the score of the leader node increases to 7b/8 and in (c) the defecting strategy
spreads through the directed links, and further on to the surrounding of the end nodes of the directed links (d). “Linked to”
in the legend means “having a directed link from the leader node.”
FIG. 6: (a) Averaged probability distribution Pw(tw) of the
waiting time tw (time between breakdowns) for b = 1.3,
p = 0.1 and pm = 0.001. This distribution to good approx-
imation consists of two exponential parts ∝ exp(−x/γ) with
the time scales γ1 = 8.0 ± 0.1, γ2 = 993 ± 7, respectively.
Without short cuts (p = 0) the time scales are γ1 = 7.9± 0.1,
γ2 = 1945 ± 4. Thus the effect of adding short cuts basi-
cally just speeds up the time evolution. (b) The recovery
time τ (see Fig. 4) versus small world rewiring probability
p at two different temptations: b = 1.3 and b = 1.45. The
recovery time decreases with increasing number of long-range
connections in case of b = 1.3 and increases for b = 1.45.
Consequently, long range connection can effect the recovering
back to steady state in opposite ways depending on the steady
state proportion between defectors and cooperators.
influential node scores highly with the defecting strategy
occurs. This may happen very rarely but when it hap-
pens the tendency of the social network to imitate the
influential node causes a dramatic breakdown of the co-
operation level. The model also contains a random mu-
tation rate. However this only speeds up the evolution
without changing the qualitative behavior.
Our model gives a crude simulation of real social be-
havior. However, it does catch a few features of potential
interest. One feature is the instability which an imitat-
ing behavior can lead to in the presence of an influential
node be it a charismatic leader, a popular media person
or some such thing. The other is that the restoration of
equilibrium can sometimes be obstructed by the presence
of long range social connections.
One may note that although the present model of
asymmetric influence is quite different in mechanism and
spirit from the recent model by Riolo, Cohen and Axel-
rod [1] both display dynamic instabilities in the cooper-
ation level.
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